






IN THE PACIFIC BASIN
SUMMER 1978Future historians will probably write book-
shelves about the striking fact that most of the
economic success stories ofthe late 20th century
have occurred in the islands and peninsulas of
East Asia. Japan of course is the obvious exam-
ple, but South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore and Malaysia all can boast similar
successes. The causes of this phenomenon are
many and complex--eultural strengths, -market
disciplines and many other factors are surely in-
volved. We do not attempt any broad answers
here, but we are able to throw some light on the
subject by investigating whether the traditional
tools of monetary and fiscal policy apply differ-
ently in these fast-growing Pacific Basin coun-
tries than in the United States. The three papers
in this issue apply new views on macro-economic
policy and new analytical techniques in an at-
tempt to advance the discussion.
Charles Pigott examines Japan's experience
with counter-cyclical monetary policy, especially
in the context of the "rational expectations" ar-
gument that a policy of this type is likely to be
ineffective. As the theory goes, counter-cyclical
policy has no systematic effect on real variables
once private agents determine how the authori-
ties conduct their policy. Once the policy is
known, the changes in the money supply it pro-
duces are predictable, so that they then cease to
influence real activity. But Pigott's results sug-
gest, at least tentatively, that counter-cyclical
policy has been used effectively, in the sense that
it has not been frustrated by offsetting actions of
the private sector.
Over the 1957-77 period, Pigott finds, antici-
pated increases in Japanese money growth stim-
ulated real economic activity-particularly
industrial production-while anticipated reduc-
tions in money growth depressed activity. But
these findings for Japan are nearly opposite to
those found in some recent studies ofU.S. mone-
tary policy. Taken together, these results imply
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that in Japan, the predictable part of money
growth affects real output most heavily, while in
the U.S., only unanticipated money growth influ-
ences economic activity. Institutional factors
may account for some ofthese differences. In Ja-
pan, short-term capital markets are less devel-
oped-and close substitutes for money are thus
less available-than in the United States. More-
over, Japanese corporations are strongly depen-
dent upon the private banking sector for external
funds, because of the relatively underdeveloped
nature of Japanese bond and equity markets.
Pigott adds that the contrasting results might
also reflect differences in U.S. and Japanese
monetary policies. In Japan, M1 grew (on aver-
age) ata stable pace, whereas in the U.S., money
growth generally increased from the mid-1960's
through the early 1970's. "This suggests that an
unexpected acceleration of money growth in the
U.s. was often followed by further above-aver-
age increases, while in Japan, on the other hand,
money acceleration was generally followed with-
in several quarters by deceleration. Consequent-
ly, an unanticipated money change in Japan,
once perceived by individuals, possibly could
have had a more temporary impact on real bal-
ances than would have been the case in the U.s.';
The success of the East Asian economies has
not encompassed price stability, according to
Michael Bazdarich. He notes that a pattern of
persistent inflation has occurred over the 1957-
77 period in eight Pacific Basin countries-six
East Asian countries plus the United States and
Australia. Price levels have climbed steadily in
those countries, and at average rates that are
high by historical standards. "Furthermore,
there is no sign of a slowdown in this phenom-
enon. World inflation has not been a temporary
outbreak, confined to a few commodity prices,
but a continuing process affecting all prices."
In this analysis, Bazdarich argues that infla-
tion can continue only ifthere are continuing in-creases in the money supply. In both the 1957-67
and 1967-77 periods, he finds statistically sig-
nificant evidence of a relation between a coun-
try's rate of money-supply growth and its
inflation rate. Using Granger causality tech-
niques, he finds that the causality runs from
money growth to inflation rather than the other
way around. The only two exceptions have the
wrong sign, indicating that a rise in the price lev-
elleads to a decline in the money supply. Pigott's
analysis suggests why this has occurred in Ja-
pan's case-the Japanese authorities have acted
to reduce money growth when faced with a rising
inflation rate relative to abroad.
Bazdarich investigates four factors which have
been said to affect money-supply growth and
therefore inflation-increased wage demands,
the OPEC oil-price hike of 1973, government
deficit spending, and the international transmis-
sion of inflation from abroad. Given the money-
price results, these sources of pressure would
have to have a systematic effect on money-
growth rates if they were systematically respon-
sible for persistent inflation. But here, Granger
causalitytests showed littlecausal effect on mon-
ey-supply growth from these commonly reputed
"inflationary" disturbances, so that they cannot
be considered sources of continued inflation.
Thus he asks, "Ifnone ofthese factors have been
consistent causes of inflation, why have the Pa-
cific Basin countries experienced monetary ex-
pansion and inflation? One explanation that is
consistent with our results (although obviously
not proven) is that monetary policy has been tru-
ly discretionary, designed to manipulate the ups
and downs of the business cycle."
In a third article, Hang-ShengCheng contrasts
the different approaches toward balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment taken by fast-growing Korea
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and Taiwan during the past several years. Both
countries sustained unusually large current-ac-
count deficits and borrowed heavily abroad fol-
lowing the 1973-74 oil shock, so that the world
banking community became concerned over
their mounting debts. Yet barely two years later,
both countries' balance ofpayments showed dra-
matic improvements and the earlier fears evapo-
rated-indeed, international bankers began to
worry instead that they would make early debt
repayments or refinance on more favorable
terms.
After the initial oil shock, Korea reduced its
trade deficit primarily by continued export ex-
pansion, while Taiwan acted by drastically re-
ducing its imports. This difference in adjustment
paths largely reflected differences in exchange-
rate policies-in particular, Korea's 18-percent
devaluation in 1974 on top ofTaiwan's 5-percent
appreciation in 1973. In Cheng's words, "Theex-
change-rate changes made Korea's export ex-
pansion possible and Taiwan's import
contraction inevitable. The different adjustment
paths meant, for Korea, sustained output growth
at the expense ofdomestic price stability, and for
Taiwan, income stagnation coupled with a low
rate ofdomestic inflation."
During the 1975-77 period, however, both
countries' trade balances improved rapidly, pri-
marily becauseofworld economic recovery coup-
led with high world-income elasticities of
demand for the two countries' exports. Indeed,
Cheng notes that the world's income elasticities
ofdemand for Korea's and Taiwan's exports are
substantially larger than these countries' income
elasticities of demand for imports. The differ-
ences help account for a long-run rising trend in
both countries' export-import ratios.